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Abstract 
This paper suggests ways donors can help the evolution of sustainable microfinance 
organizations. Sustainability is good because it helps MFOs help more poor people than otherwise. 
Sustainability is hard because it requires balancing outreach and sustainability with prices the poor 
can afford yet high enough to cover the costs of the MFO. Donors are like genetic engineers whose 
job is to speed the evolution of sturdy MFOs. Technical assistance is the best way to tinker with 
MF Os. 
1. Introduction 
Ways Donors Can Help the Evolution 
of Sustainable Microfinance Organizations 
by 
Mark Schreiner 
Donors in microfinance are like genetic engineers. They should speed the evolution of the 
sturdy microfinance organizations. Donors believe that evolution by trial-and-error in a laissez-faire 
market would take too long. For example, donors can disseminate lessons from mistakes of MF Os 
trying to strike a balance between outreach and sustainability. This cross-pollination not only helps 
mistakes die out by letting MF Os learn from others' mistakes, but it also helps to replicate the strong 
features of good MFOs while deepening the pool from which healthy MFOs can emerge. 
Donors have limited comparative advantages in quickening the evolution of stout MFOs. 
Donors are good at giving funds, measuring progress, and spreading good practice through technical 
assistance. Measuring progress and giving technical assistance spark better experimentation than 
giving funds. Funds are like food; MFOs feed and get bigger. Technical assistance is like school; 
MFOs learn and get better. 
Donors husband microfinance by creating an environment that rewards success and punishes 
failure. To culture strains ofMFOs that balance sustainability and outreach, donors must lubricate 
entry and exit (Von Pischke, 1992). 
Experiments to strengthen MFOs are not safe. Progress may come only after costly mistakes, 
if it comes at all. Experimental MFOs may mutate into financial Frankensteins, well-meaning but 
blundering monsters doing more harm than good. Although donors work outside the market, they 
must mimic market forces so as to iron-out wrinkles and weed out experiments headed for dead-
ends. 
Section 2 defines sustainability and discusses the importance of profits. Section 3 discusses 
why measuring sustainability helps sustainability. Section 4 discusses how different forms of help 
from donors impinge on sustainability. Section 5 concludes. 
2. What is sustainability? 
Sustainability is the ability to repeat performance. A sustainable MFO is permanent, but it 
is not constant; its organization and its structure of incentives must be flexible so that managers can 
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adapt and adjust to keep performing well in a shifting environment. Sustainable MFOs meet their 
goals now without harming their ability to meet their goals later. 
Performance is fulfilling the mission of microfinance. Microfinance is the sale of small loans 
and deposits. Outreach is the production of microfinance. The mission of microfinance is to help 
poor people by cutting the cost of outreach. An MFO helps the poor if it makes outreach cheaper 
than traditional banks. 
Society is all people in the world. The goal of society is to maximize social welfare. Social 
welfare is social benefits less social costs. An MFO is worthwhile from the point of view of society 
if it makes more social benefits than social costs. Donors get resources taken by governments from 
rich taxpayers in high-income countries and give them to MFOs selling to the poor in low-income 
countries. Society may weigh benefits for the poor more than costs for the rich. 
Sustainability matters because society cares about the poor now and in the future. 
Unsustainable MFOs might help the poor now, but they will not help the poor in the future because 
the MFO will be gone. Unsustainable MFOs might not even help the poor now (Adams et al., 1984). 
Unsustainable MFOs might be worse than no MFOs at all because they may hurt exactly those they 
wanted to help (Krahnen and Schmidt, 1994). 
Sustaining performance takes true profits. True profits are what accounting profits would be 
if the MFO paid for the opportunity cost of its resources, did not get any grants counted as revenue, 
and did not get any grants in kind not counted as expenses. 
Just as infant firms need venture capital, infant MFOs need subsidized resources from donors. 
But fledgling MFOs need to be weaned fast because donors will soon abandon them in the 
marketplace. Access to subsidized resources waxes and wanes as donors tire and as political moods 
swing. Donors are fickle, and they will withdraw. Without profits, an MFO will shrink and die. 
Even if subsidies were permanent, sustainability would still help fulfill the goal of society. 
After all, the poor are plenty but the donor dollars are few. Without profits, MFOs cannot attract 
private capital and so cannot saturate the market for microfinance (Rosenberg, 1994). Selfish 
investors will not start MF Os from scratch unless subsidized MF Os are profitable. If MF Os are so 
profitable they attract private investors, then outreach would mushroom. Social benefits would 
skyrocket, and social costs would shrivel. Social welfare would improve. 
Sustainability, profits, and repayment are linked. Losses are the symptoms of a sick MFO, 
and borrowers will stop repayment. This weakens the MFO unto death. 
The drive for profits is tempered by the mission to sell outreach to the poor. An MFO that 
abandons the poor by selling big loans and big deposits is not a sustainable MFO because it no 
longer lives as an MFO. Without the poor, MFOs are just banks. MFOs must walk a tightrope, 
balancing the poor and profits (Hulme and Mosley, 1996). 
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3. Why measuring sustainability helps sustainability 
Measurement sparks good performance and casts light on bad performance (Von Pischke, 
1996). Measurement of sustainability is a tool that can help donors build sustainability in at least five 
ways. 
First, measurement forces the explicit definition of goals. Vague goals wither under attempts 
at measurement. Abstractions like sustainability can become buzzwords unless anchored in the nuts-
and-bolts of measurement. 
Second, measurement changes goals. Managers and donors who measure profits cannot help 
but worry more about profits. 
Third, measurement exposes priorities. Willingness to measure sustainability shows 
willingness to work toward it. MFOs learned that success was only disbursing money when that was 
all donors measured. 
Fourth, measurement helps management. Technical feedback helps detect trends, set targets, 
and make benchmarks for comparisons with peers (Richardson, 1994; Koch, 1992). 
Fifth, measurement proves what microfinance can do. Donors are pressured to demand 
sustainability from MFOs. Without measurement, however, donors will be pestered by the fear that 
sustainability may be, in fact, impossible. Hesitant donors will expect less and get less from MFOs. 
A few recent success stories offer the tempting vision of sustainable MFOs (Gonzalez-Vega et al., 
1997; Khandker, 1996; Chaves and Gonzalez-Vega, 1996; Christen et al., 1995). This dares donors 
to measure progress toward sustainability. 
Sustainability, worthwhileness, and pseudo-benefit-cost analysis 
Sustainability is sufficient, but not necessary, for worthwhileness. Profits are necessary, but 
not sufficient, for sustainability. It follows that there is not necessarily any relation between profits 
and worthwhileness (Figure 1 ). 
Still, society wants donors to maximize worthwhileness. If MF Os are worthwhile, then their 
level of worthwhileness will be maximized by sustainability. This is because the profits of 
sustainable MFOs can attract private investors who can fund more and bigger MFOs than donors 
ever could. 
Measuring worthwhileness requires benefit-cost analysis which requires measuring both 
benefits and costs. A sustainable MFOs is known to be worthwhile without benefit-cost analysis. But 
most MFOs are not yet sustainable. It is not enough to know that benefits are positive for these 
MFOs because costs are also known to be positive, and costs could be more than benefits. 
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Measuring costs is less cutting-edge than measuring benefits. The nitty-gritty details loan-
loss provisions, tracking subsidies, and assuming opportunity costs are boring. But mistakes in 
measuring costs kill because they lead to non-sustainable MFOs. Mistakes in measuring benefits are 
not so fatal. Luckily, measuring costs is cheaper than measuring benefits (Adams, 1988; David and 
Meyer, 1983). This is true even though the cost of measuring benefits is falling (Hulme and Mosley, 
1996; Pitt and Khandker, 1996; Bolnick and Nelson, 1990). 
Measuring benefits requires a lot of good data from surveys of people before and after using 
the MFO and/or surveys of users and of identical non-users at a point in time. This takes a lot of 
time, money, and care. Complicated econometrics is needed to wipe out the effects of self-selection 
and fungibility (Moffitt, 1991; Von Pischke and Adams, 1980). 
In contrast, measuring costs requires financial statements, talks with donors and accountants, 
and time at a desk. The math is straightforward. If opportunity costs are defined from the point of 
view of society and not from the point of view of the MFO and if past social costs are sunk, then the 
measure of subsidy in the framework of the Subsidy Dependence Index of Y aron (1992a and 1992b) 
measures social costs in a period. 
Pseudo-benefit-cost analysis asks how high the surplus of the users of an MFO would have 
to be to make social benefits more than social costs. The analysis can span either from birth to the 
present or from the present to the future. 
Pseudo-benefit-costs analysis is cheap for three reasons. First, it is cheap to measure social 
costs in the framework of the SDI. Second, it is cheap to measure the average dollar-years of debt 
or of deposits produced by an MFO. Third, the average social benefit of the average borrower or 
depositor is a multiple of the average debt or deposits outstanding, so the costs of measuring benefits 
can be skipped. Gale (1991) and Binswanger and Khandker (1995) use pseudo-benefit-cost analysis 
to look at subsidized finance. If the benefit-cost rule itself were judged by a benefit-cost rule, 
measuring only costs without benefits may beat measuring both benefits and costs. 
Humans must judge sustainability 
A negative SDI is necessary, but not sufficient, for sustainability. Sustainability happens over 
time in the unknown future. One year of serving the poor with profits does not imply continued good 
performance any more than one year of marriage implies happily ever after. 
Quantitative measures inform the qualitative assessment of sustainability by a human analyst. 
Forecasting future performance takes human work and smarts because it is holistic, synthetic, and 
idiosyncratic. Forecasts must be grounded in present and past performance and informed by the 
analyst's knowledge of the particular MFO and ofMFOs in general. 
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Human judgement is also needed for pseudo-benefit-cost analysis. Only humans can judge 
whether the surplus needed to make the MFO worthwhile is so small that actual, unmeasured surplus 
is likely to be more. 
Privateness is a signal of sustainability 
Profits are magnets for private investors. Private ownership helps worthwhileness because 
private owners press for profits. Profits are necessary for sustainability, and sustainability is 
sufficient for worthwhileness. 
Donors, even if they own shares, are not the same as private owners. Donors do not want 
dividends, nor do they plan to sell their shares for a gain. In contrast, private owners are blind to all 
but dividends and retained earnings. Unlike private owners, the people in donor organizations are 
not gambling with their own money, and their personal goals may blind them to the goals of society. 
It is more likely that an investor will be selfish than that a donor will be selfless. 
Trades with private entities involve resources belonging to the traders. Private trades are 
repeatable and thus sustainable because the parties choosing to trade have made a secret benefit-cost 
analysis and found that the benefits were more than the costs. If a trade is in the best interests of a 
private entity now, the safest assumption is that nothing will change in the future. 
In contrast, trades involving non-private entities such as donors are not repeatable and thus 
are not sustainable because they are not selfish actions. The resources traded do not belong to the 
parties choosing to trade. Donors dole out funds wrenched from unwilling taxpayers. 
Privateness is also a useful signal of healthy incentives. Useful indicators are the presence 
of private owners and a mission statement explicitly promoting profits and sustainability. The best 
signal of robust incentives is diverse, private funding sources, especially from deposits (Inter-
American Development Bank, 1994; Chaves and Gonzalez-Vega, 1993). 
4. The best ways to give subsidized resources to MFOs 
Subsidized resources are not the same as subsidies. Subsidized resources are what donors 
entrust to MFOs at prices below their opportunity cost. Subsidy is the opportunity cost less what the 
MFO pays. All resources from donors are subsidized. Subsidies cannot be negative; an MFO would 
not hassle with a donor if it could trade on the market at a better price. 
For example, suppose a donor lends an MFO L for a year at an interest rate of c. Let m<c be 
the opportunity cost of a loan of like risk. The MFO gains subsidized resources from the loan equal 
to the opportunity cost less what is paid, L-(m-c). This is like an injection of equity because, without 
the loan, expenses would be that much higher and so equity that much lower. 
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The subsidy from the use of the subsidized resources is not L-(m-c) but rather m·L-(m-c ). The 
debt L is repaid and so is neither subsidy nor subsidized resource. 
Subsidized resources are linked to subsidies in that subsidies from the use of subsidized 
resources become subsidized resources. For example, suppose an MFO got m·L-(m-c) as a subsidy 
in a period. An unsubsidized MFO would have to pay this m·L-(m-c) in the period, and, to keep from 
shrinking, it would have to increase its average debt in the period by m·L·(m-c)/2. This extra debt 
would cost the unsubsidized MFO m2·L·(m-c)/2. This is also a subsidy since it is a cost paid by an 
unsubsidized MFO but not paid by a subsidized MFO. 
A typology of subsidized resources 
An MFO can get subsidized resources in six ways. Three are explicit, and three are implicit 
(Figure 2). Explicit subsidized resources come from donor transfers. Implicit subsidized resources 
come from the MFO not paying opportunity costs. 
The first four forms of subsidized resources are non-repeatable, and the last two forms are 
repeatable (Figure 2). When donors leave, MFOs repay only debt. Non-repeatable transfers end when 
a donor leaves, but repeatable transfers do not. 
The first way an MFO can get subsidized resources is explicitly as a cash grant accounted 
for as equity. The subsidy is not the grant itself but rather the opportunity cost of the subsidized 
resources from the grant. 
Second, an MFO can get subsidized resources explicitly as a cash grant accounted for as 
revenue. Grants are not revenue from operations, so all grants should be counted as injections of 
equity. Still, some MF Os misleadingly inflate profits by counting grants as revenue. Equity changes 
the same in either case. The subsidy is not the grant itself but rather the opportunity cost of the extra 
equity. 
Third, an MFO can get subsidized resources explicitly as discounts on operating expenses 
from grants in kind. Examples include technical assistance, travel, training, cars, or computers. 
Discounts increase equity just like grants. The subsidy is the opportunity cost of the extra equity. 
Fourth, an MFO can get subsidized resources implicitly as discounts on debt. The discount 
is the market price of debt of like risk less the price the MFO paid. The subsidy is not the discount 
but rather the unpaid opportunity cost of the use of the subsidized resources from the discount. 
Fifth, an MFO can get subsidized resources implicitly as capitalized subsidies. Subsidies are 
like discounts on subsidized resources. Like equity injections, these subsidies become subsidized 
resources with an opportunity cost. 
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Sixth, an MFO can get subsidized resources implicitly as positive profits. Positive profits 
belong to owners. If positive profits are not withdrawn but left as positive retained earnings, then 
they have an opportunity cost just like any other form of equity. Negative profits do not have an 
opportunity cost. Negative profits are not claims by the MFO on owners, and they do not decrease 
the investment owners have sunk in the MFO. 
Why the forms of subsidized resources matter 
All six forms of subsidized resources have the same opportunity cost. Still, in addition to the 
explicit/implicit and repeatable/non-repeatable distinctions, the form of subsidized resources matters 
in at least seven ways. 
First, discounts on operating expenses can change the production technology, shifting the 
average-cost curve down. Technical assistance is the most important example. A donor might pay 
for loan officers to be trained in a certain lending method or for managers to attend talks inculcating 
ideas the donor likes. Good technical assistance not only shifts the average-cost curve down but also 
makes it slope down more steeply as the MFO grows. 
Second, grants of cash increase the funds the MFO can use as it likes. Growth slides the 
MFO along its average-cost curve. If all is well, costs fall. 
Third, trading cash for shares gives donors some control over the MFO through seats on its 
board. Other forms of subsidized resources do not give this control. For example, the influence 
provided by a grant fades fast unless the donor tempts the MFO by dangling more grants. Having 
owners may also help the MFO to qualify for prudential regulation and supervision. 
Fourth, the resources from grants in cash can be used to lend more. If there are non-
fungibilities, then grants in kind may not lead to as much additional lending. Grants in cash may also 
dampen incentives to find market funds. 
Fifth, discounts on operating expenses may pay for intangible assets. An example is technical 
assistance for training loan officers or for organizing management-information systems. These 
intangible assets are not in the accounts, but they bear fruit over time. 
Sixth, explicit transfers are harder politically than implicit transfers. 
Seventh, MFOs might spend cash without strings attached more wisely than they would use 
resources from in-kind grants with the same worth. 
Why technical assistance is best 
If the incentives of the managers of MF Os are the same as the incentives of donors, then 
donors should just grant MFOs cash without strings attached. After all, the MFOs would know their 
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own needs better than donors would. But the incentives of the managers rarely coincide with those 
of donors and/or society. Both want to help the poor, but managers also care about keeping their 
good jobs. Managers can secure their jobs at a much lower, much easier level of performance than 
what donors want to ensure worthwhileness. The opportunity cost of subsidized resources from the 
point of view of managers is the rate of inflation. This is lower than the opportunity cost from the 
point of view of society. 
In general, donors should give subsidized resources as in-kind grants of technical assistance. 
If donors must give cash, they should buy shares. Shares give donors more control than all other 
forms of subsidized resources except technical assistance. 
Technical assistance lets donors fine-tune the production technology while bestowing long-
lasting, intangible assets. Technical assistance has the unique quality ofletting donors target specific 
cogs in the present and future productive capacity of the MFO. For example, paying for training to 
help flexibility does not have the same effect as giving the same amount of cash without strings 
attached. 
Technical assistance can also promote sustainability in ways cash cannot. Technical 
assistance can empower the MFO with tools, abilities, and incentives. It aims to solve the problems 
that keep the MFO itself from solving its problems. 
There is still a role for financial assistance. In particular, financial assistance can motivate 
joining a program that otherwise stresses technical assistance. While money rations may be the 
spoonful or sugar that helps the medicine of technical assistance go down, MF Os must guard against 
addiction. 
5. Concluding thoughts 
Feedback makes markets work. It selects strong firms and strikes down weak ones. But the 
feedback loop between donors and MFOs is often blocked. For a time, donors can protect weak 
MF Os from being crushed by market forces. Donors must mimic market forces if they expect their 
MFOs to survive the inevitable move from captivity to the wild where it must fend for itself. Funds 
from donors should build organizations able to survive in the market without funds from donors 
(Rhyne and Otero, 1993). 
Oddly, cartels among donors can improve competition among MFOs and thus speed 
evolution. Competition among donors wrecks incentives for sustainability by weakening threats to 
cut assistance. Competition also makes donors unwilling to push fledgling MFOs that are nearing 
sustainability out of the nest for fear another donor will grab it and take credit for its near-success. 
In fact, just as those who already have credit are those most likely to get more credit, the 
MFOs that need donors the least are exactly those MFOs whose umbilical cord is the toughest to cut. 
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Cutting an MFO loose takes discipline by donors (Krahnen and Schmidt, 1994). Donor, examine 
thyself. 
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Figure 1: Relations between Profits, Sustainability, and Worthwhileness 
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Figure 2: Ways an MFO can get subsidized resources 
Form Explicit or implicit 
1. Grants accounted for as equity 
2. Grants accounted for as revenue 
Explicit 
3. Discounts on operating expenses 
4. Discounts on debt from donors 
5. Capitalized subsidies 
Implicit 
6. Positive profits 
Repeatable or non-repeatable 
Non-repeatable 
Repeatable 
